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284 CocKERELL v. TrTUD INs. & TausT Co. [42 C.2d 
LL. A. No. 22764. fn Bank. l<'eb. 24, 1954.1 
l{OWENA J:1'. COCKEitBLL et al., Appellants, v. TITLE 
INSURANCE AND TRUST COMPANY (a Corpora-
tion) et al., Defendants and Respondents; T. E. DENNY 
et al., Cross-Complainants and Respondents. 
[1] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case-Rule as 
to Answer.-vVhere, notwithstanding faet that denials in an 
answer are not as broad as allegations of complaint or are 
otherwise insufficient to put allegations of complaint in issue, 
answer is treated as putting material facts in issue, plaintiff 
cannot for first time on appeal object that such denials are 
insufficient for any purpose. 
[2] !d.-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-A party can-
not permit an issue to be litigated and on appeal escape con-
sequences by claiming that such issue was not pleaded. 
[3] Pleading- Judgment on Pleadings- Motion by Plaintiff.-
Plaintiffs cannot on appeal predicate error on ruling of trial 
court in denying their motion for judgment on pleadings on 
ground that defendants admitted all allegations of complaint 
except that for lack of information or belief they denied 
alleged assignment of third trust deed to plaintiffs and balance 
which defendants assumed when they purchased property 
from record owners, where there is no allegation in complaint 
that defendants had knowledge as to how plaintiffs' alleged 
assignor derived title nor that they knew how plaintiffs them-
selves derived title. 
[4] Trust Deeds-Assignment of Debt.-If assignment of note 
secured by trust deed is valid, no further assignment of trust 
deed is necessary since assignment of note carries with it the 
security as an incident of debt. (See Civ. Code, § 1084.) 
[5] Assignments-Form and Requisites.-While no particular form 
of assignment is necessary, the assignment of a right, to be 
effectual, must be a manifestation to another person by the 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 149; Am.Jur., Appeal 
and Error, § 316 et seq. 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Trust Deeds, § 34; Am.Jur., Mortgages, § 977 
et seq. 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Assignments, § 34; Am.Jur., Assignments, 
§ 75 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error,§ 131; [2] Appeal 
and Error, § 125; [3] Pleadings, § 241(7); [ 4, 6, 9] Trust Deeds, 
§ 29; [ 5] Assignments, § 28; [7] Assignments, § 91; [8] Assign-
ments, § 94; [10] Assignments, § 91; [11] Trust Deeds, § 100. 
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owner indicating his intention to transfer, without further 
action or manifestation of intention, the right to such other 
person or to a third person. 
[6a-6c] Trust Deeds-Assignment of Debt.-Plaintiffs failed to 
prove assignment to them of note secured by third trust deed 
where note was made payable to a limited partnership but no 
connection was shown between partnership and individual who 
purported to assign it on behalf of firm, where only evidence 
linking the two was one plaintiff's testimony that she knew 
a certain individual who was member of firm and that it was 
his signature, and where she had been told by a "party" that 
it was a "limited company," such evidence being insufficient 
to show that partnership had complied with statutory pro-
visions relating to use of a fictitious name ( Civ. Code, § 2468), 
or that individual who signed note was member of partnership 
or had authority to bind it. 
[7] Assignments-Burden of Proof.-Burden of proving an assign-
ment falls on the party asserting rights thereunder. 
[8] Id.-Evidence.-In action by assignee to enforce assigned 
right, evidence must not only be sufficient to establish fact of 
assignment when that fact is in issue, but measure of suffi-
ciency requires that evidence of assignment be clear and posi-
tive to protect an obligor from any further claim by primary 
obligee. 
[9] Trust Deeds-Assignment of Debt.-Plaintiffs, claiming as 
assignees of a partnership, have burden of proving existence 
and membership of firm to support their claim of ownership of 
note and trust deed by virtue of assignment of note signed 
by an individual on behalf of partnership. 
[10] Assignments- Presumption.-Court will not presume that 
person whose name is subscribed to an assignment on behalf 
of a partnership actually executed assignment or had author-
ity to execute it. 
[11] Trust Deeds-Sale Under Power-Application of Proceeds-
Surplus.-Plaintiffs, having failed to prove valid assignment 
to them of note secured by third trust deed, have no standing 
to complain of judgment awarding surplus yield resulting 
from trustee's sale of property under second trust deed to de-
fendants who are only other claimants of such surplus. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Thurmond Clarke, ,Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for declaratory relief. Judgment against plaintiffs 
affirmed. 
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N. S. Crowley for Appellants. 
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents. 
Morris Lavine for Cross-Complainants and Respondents. 
CAR'l'ER, J.-Plaintiffs and cross-defendants, Rowena F. 
Cockerell and Jeannie A. Hinds, appeal from a judgment 
entered against them in an action for declaratory relief. 
On August 1951, Ernest A. Coe and Helen Jean Coe, 
husband and wife, were the record owners of the real prop-
erty here involved. This property was subject to a first deed 
of trust dated May 5, 1947, executed by Metropole Holding 
Company, Inc., a corporation, to Lawyers Title Company, 
trustee, to secure an indebtedness of $63,000. It was also 
subject to a second trust deed dated October 16, 1947, exe-
cuted by Omart Investment Company, Ltd., to Title Insur-
ance and Trust Company, trustee, to secure an indebtedness 
of $27,500. It was subject to a third trust deed, dated Sep-
tember 23, 1948, executed by Russ Green and Ethyl Green 
to Security First National Bank of Los Angeles, trustee, 
to secure an indebtedness of $10,983.80 in favor of Crestmore 
Company. Plaintiffs' claim is by virtue of an alleged assign-
ment from the Crestmore Company. 
Defendants and cross-complainants, T. E. Denny and Edna 
Denny, on August 28, 1951, held an unrecorded deed to the 
property which they had received from Ernest A. Coe and 
Helen Jean Coe. 
On April 26, 1951, foreclosure proceedings in accordance 
with the provisions of section 2924 of the Civil Code were 
instituted by the Title Insurance and Trust Company, as 
trustee, under the second deed of trust. These proceedings 
culminated in a sale which was held on August 28, 1951. 
At this sale, the trustee 'l'itle Insurance and Trust Company 
received the sum of $25,950. 'fhe balance due, under the deed 
of trust so foreclosed, including the expenses of sale, amounted 
to $19,023.98 leaving a surplus yield of $6,926.02. This 
surplus yield is the subject matter of the controversy be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs claim as the owners 
of the third trust deed by virtue of assignment from the bene-
ficiary, Crestmore Company; defendants claim as the owners 
of the unrecorded deed to the property. Both parties made 
demands for the surplus yield upon defendant trustee, Title 
Insurance Company. Defendant trustee answered and cross-
complained, and was permitted to deposit with the clerk of 
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the court the :mrplm; funds to the sum of 
and the action was ordered dismissed as to it. 
The trial court found that T. E. and Edna 
Denny, were the owners of the involved; that there 
was a surplus yield of $6,926.02 after the foreclosure sale 
under the second deed of trust; that at the time of the trustee's 
sale, there was on record a third trust deed, exe-
cuted by Russ Green and Ethyl Green, to Security-:B~irst 
National Bank of Los Angeles, in favor of Crest-
more Company, as well as a purported fourth trust deed 
executed by 'l'. I-i1. and Edna ,Denny to J_~iberty Escrow 
Company, trustee, in favor of Ernest A. and Helen .Tean 
Coe. It was found that the liens, if any, of the third and 
fourth trust deeds, were extinguished by the foreclosure of 
the second deed of trust; that it was not true that plaintiffs 
were the owners of the note and third deed of trust by means 
of assignment by the Crestmore Company; that it was not 
true that there was an unpaid balance due plaintiffs on their 
alleged third deed of trust and note in the sum of $7,049.35. 
It was also found that Emest A. and Helen Jean Coe had 
no right, title, or interest in or to the real property involved, 
or to the surplus yield; that plaintiffs had no right, title or 
interest in the surplus yield or the real property; that T. E. 
and Edna Denny, as joint tenants, were entitled to a judg-
ment for the surplus yield. 
Plaintiffs' first contention is that the court erred in deny-
ing their motion for judgment on the pleadings. It was 
argued that the only issues raised in the pleadings were issues 
of law. In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged their ownership 
of the note secured by the third deed of trust by virtue of an 
assignment from the Crestmore Company. 'l'his was denied, 
upon lack of information by the defendants. Plaintiffs con-
tend that a judgment may be rendered on the pleadings if 
the answer consists of denials on information and belief or 
for want of information or belief of matters which the de-
fendant is pres1rmerl to know (21 Cal..Jur. 237; Wickersham 
v. Comerford, 104 Cal. 494 [38 P. 101] and Overton v. White, 
]8 Cal.App.2d 567 [64 P.2d 758, 65 P.2d 99]). No contention 
is made that tbe denial contained in defendants' answer 
'' ... these defendants do not have sufficient information 
as to the allegation contained therein [as to the fact of as-
signment] and basing their denial upon that ground, gen-
erally and specifically deny the same" is insufficient to raise 
an issue as to the fact o£ assignment because it does not follow 
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the wording of the statute (Code Civ. Pro c., § 437, which 
provides fol' a denial upon lack of 'infor-rnat'ion or- bel!ief). 
'fhis type of denial has been held insufficient to raise an issue 
of ownership (May v. Boar-d of Dir-ector-s of El Camino Trr-. 
Dist., 34 Cal.2d 125 l208 P.2d 661] ). However, at the trial 
plaintiffs treated the question of assignment as an issue, and 
at the commencement of the trial, introduced in evidence the 
note bearing on its back the assignment thereof to them. The 
only evidence as to the assignment was introduced by plain-
tiff Hinds as will hereafter appear. [1] It is a general 
rule that where, notwithstanding the fact that the denials in an 
answer are not as broad as the allegations of the complaint 
or are otherwise insufficient to put the allegations of the com-
plaint in issue, but the answer is treated as putting the ma-
terial facts in issue, the plaintiff cannot for the first time 
on appeal object that such denials were insufficient for any 
purpose (3 Cal.Jur.2d, § 149; Adarns v. Bell, 5 Cal.2d 697 
[56 P.2d 208]; Hernandez v. Her-nandez, 109 Cal.App.2d 
903 [242 P.2d 59]). In A1·onson &; Co. v. Pear-son, 199 Cal. 
295, 298-299 [249 P. 191], it was said: "Such a denial will 
not be held fatally defective upon appeal if it was treated 
by the parties at the trial as creating an issue, but, since in 
this case neither party offered any evidence bearing upon the 
question, there is no ground for holding that it was so 
treated.'' Any objection to the sufficiency of the denial in 
defendants' answer could have been obviated had proper ob-
jection thereto been made in the court below. To hold now 
that the defective answer raised no issue of fact when it was 
so treated by all the parties and the court upon the trial 
below would be "clearly unjust." 
The situation here is somewhat similar to those cases where 
issues not raised by the pleadings are litigated at the trial 
without objection. [2] As stated by Mr. Justice Schauer 
in Va~tghn v. Jonas, 31 Cal.2d 586, at page 605 [191 P.2d 
432] : "The evidence hereinabove reviewed is consistent with 
the view that the case was tried on the theory that malice was 
at issue and that punitive damages were claimed. A party can-
not permit an issue to be litigated and on appeal escape the 
consequences by claiming that such issue was not pleaded. 
(Slaughter v. Goldber-g, Bowen &; Co. (1915), 26 Cal.App. 
318, 325 [147 P. 90]; Boyle v. Coast Improvement Co. (1915), 
27 Cal.App. 714, 720-721 [151 P. 25]; Hir-sch v. Jarnes S. 
Remick Co. (1918), 38 Cal.App. 764, 767 [177 P. 876]; 
Pioneer Truck Co. v. Hawley (1920), 47 Cal.App. 594, 595 
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[190 P. 1037 J ; McCord v. Martin (1920), 47 Cal.App. 717, 
723 [191 P. 89 J ; Avakian v. Noble (1898), 121 Cal. 216, 219 
[53 P. 559]; 8 Cal.Jur. 893.)" 
[3] Moreover it is apparent from the phraseology used 
in plaintiffs' brief on appeal that they considered the denial 
technically sufficient. Plaintiffs argue (p. 10) "Defendants 
Denny admitted all the facts alleged, except that they denied 
for lack of information or belief the alleged assignment of the 
third trust deed to plaintiffs and the balance which said 
defendants assumed when they purchased the property from 
defendants Coe. 
"Plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings on the 
rule that denials on information and belief of facts presump-
tively within the knowledge of the defendants raised no issue. 
. . . " It was also stated that "The defendants, T. E. Denny 
and Edna Denny admitted all the allegations of the complaint 
e.xcept that for lack of information or belief they denied the 
allegations of ownership of the third trust deed in the plain-
tiffs and for the same reason denied the alleged balance due 
thereunder.'' (Emphasis added.) 
It appears here that defendants did not, presumably, have 
knowledge as to how plaintiffs' alleged assignor derived title 
since there is no allegation to that effect in the complaint, 
nor did they know how plaintiffs themselves derived title 
since the only allegations concerning it is the statement that 
they claim by virtue of an assignment from the Crestmore 
Company which, in turn, claimed under a trust deed executed 
by Russ and Ethyl Green who were, apparently, strangers to 
the title. It follows that under the circumstances here pre-
vailing plaintiffs cannot now predicate error on the ruling of 
the trial court in denying their motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. 
It is next contended that the court erred in finding that 
plaintiffs were not the owners of the third trust deed and 
note by virtue of assignment. This is, essentially, a conten-
tion that the evidence is insufficient to support the iindings 
of the court in this respect. Mrs. ,T eannie A. Hinds, the only 
one of the two plaintiffs to testify, said that she received the 
note late in the evening on the day before the foreclosure 
sale. The note was received in evidence. The note, for 
$10,983.80, secured by a deed of trust, was made payable to 
"Crestmore Co., a Limited partnership. P. 0. Box 365, Fon-
tana'' and was signed by Russ Green and Ethyl Green. On 
42 C.2d-10 
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the reverse side was endorsed ''The undersigned does hereby 
assign this note to the account of Rowena F. Cockerell and 
Jeannie i'i. Hinds, as of the 27th day of August, 1951. 
[Signed] The Crestmore Co. P. H. Wierman." Plaintiff 
Hinds testified that ''a party'' had told her about the Crest-
more Company and that she knew there were three members : 
''Paul and Bob Wierman, brothers, and one other woman. 
I don't know her name just at this minute, but they were 
checked on as to the company and being in their name.'' 
Plaintiffs were unable to produce the articles of partnership. 
There was no other evidence as to either the Crestmore Com-
pany or the P. H. Wierman who purportedly signed the en-
dorsement other than plaintiff Hinds' testimony that she knew 
it was his signature. On August 27, 1951, on a plain sheet 
of paper entitled ''To whom it may concern'' there was a 
statement signed by "P. H. Wierman, Crestmore Company"· 
that ''Rowena F. Cockerell and Jeannie A. Hinds are the 
beneficiaries of an escrow in which the assignment of a third 
trust deed, document No. 1205 recorded at request of Title 
Insurance & Trust Co., Oct. 1, 1949, at 8 a. m., Book 28401, 
Page 55, in the Official Records, County of Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, to their account in progress and they have full right 
and title to said third trust deed and all benefits from such 
from this day on." It was admitted by plaintiffs that this 
paper was the only assignment which they had relating to the 
trust deed. Plaintiff Hinds testified that an escrow was 
opened on August 29, 1951, for the sale of the note to plain-
tiffs; that she gave her note for $6300 which was to be returned 
to her in the event that certain other documents and notes 
were turned over to the escrow holder in completion of the 
escrow. The escrow instructions, dated August 28, 1951, 
read, in part, that "Receipt is hereby acknowledged by 
Rowena F. Cockerell and Jeannie A. Hinds for trust deed 
in the amount of ten thousand nine hundred eighty three 
dollars and eighty cents ($10,983.80) balance due approxi-
mately sixty eight hundred dollars ($6,800.00), delivered out-
side of escrow and not the concern of this escrow . ... " (Em-
phasis added.) 
Plaintiff Hinds' testimony with respect to the Crestmore 
Company and P. H. 'Wierman was received over objection 
that no foundation had been laid, that the answer called for a 
conclusion of the witness, and that her answers were hearsay. 
She testified that the signature on the reverse side of the note 
was that of a Mr. Paul Wierman who was a member of the 
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Crestmore Company; that the Crestmore Company was a 
"limited company"; that "a party in San Bernardino" had 
told her. Defendants objected and moved to strike her testi-
mony on the ground that it was not the best evidence of 
the partnership and that her answers were ''conclusions.'' 
The third trust deed was admitted in evidence over the objec-
tion that there had been no showing that it had been as-
signed, or any record of its assignment to the plaintiffs. 
[4] Assuming for the moment that the assignment of 
the note, secured by the third trust deed, was a valid 
assignment, no further assignment of the deed of trust was 
necessary. Section 1084 of the Civil Code provides that "The 
transfer of a thing transfers also all its incidents, unless 
expressly excepted; but the transfer of an incident to a thing 
does not transfer the thing itself." (See, also, Hurt v. Wilson, 
38 Cal. 263; Lewis v. Booth, 3 Cal.2d 345 [44 P.2d 560]; 
1J1arx v. McKinney, 23 Cal.2d 439, 443 [144 P.2d 353]; Union 
Supply Co. v. Jlforris, 220 Cal. 331 [30 P.2d 394] .) In Lewis 
v. Booth, supm, 3 Cal.2d 345, it was held that an acknowledg-
ment was not necessary to effect an assignment of the trust 
deed and that the endorsement of the note by the payee 
was sufficient to transfer the deed of trust without other 
assignment. In Santens v. Los Angeles Finance Co., 91 Cal. 
App.2d 197 [204 P.2d 619], it was held that the note carries 
with it the security and the trust deed was merely an 
incident of the debt and could only be foreclosed by the 
owner of the note. 
Plaintiff Hinds' testimony and the endorsement on the 
note secured by the third deed of trust showed that it was 
given on August 27th, 1951, the night before the foreclosure 
sale under the second deed of trust. If the assignment were 
otherwise sufficient, it would have been given prior to the 
foreclosure sale because the time of transfer of the deed 
of trust is immaterial under the authorities above cited. 
[5] ·while no particular form of assignment is necessary, 
the assignment, to be effectual, must be a manifestation to 
another person by the owner of the right indicating his 
intention to transfer, without further action or manifestation 
of intention, the right to such other person, or to a third person 
(Rest. Contracts, § 149(1); Anglo California Nat. Bank v. 
Kidd, 58 Cal.App.2d 651 [137 P.2d 460]). [6a] The note here 
was made payable to '' Crestmore Co., a Limited Partnership 
P. 0. Box 365, Fontana." The note shows no connection 
between the Crestmore Company and the P. H. Wierman who 
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purported to assign it on behalf of that company. The only 
evidence in the record linking the two is that of plaintiff 
Hinds who testified she knew a Mr. Paul \Vierman who was 
a member of the firm and that it was his signature. She had 
been told by a "party" that it was a "limited company." 
'fhe record is devoid of any evidence showing a compliance 
with section 2468 of the Civil Code which provides, in part, 
that "No person doing business under a fictitious name, or 
his assignee or assignees, nor any persons doing business as 
partners contrary to the provisions of this article or their 
assignee or assignees shall maintain any action upon or on 
account of any contract or contracts made, or transactions 
had under such fictitious name, or their partnership name, 
in any court of this state until the certificate has been filed 
and publication made as herein required.'' (Emphasis added.) 
[7] The burden of proving an assignment falls upon the 
party asserting rights thereunder (Read v. Buffnm, sttpra, 
79 Cal. 77 [21 P. 555, 12 Am.St.Rep. 131] ; Ford v. Bttshard, 
116 Cal. 273 [ 48 P. 119] ; Bovard v. Dickenson, 131 Cal. 162 
[ 63 P. 162] ; Nakagawa v. Okanwto, 164 Cal. 718 [130 P. 707]). 
[8] In an action by an assignee to enforce an assigned right, 
the evidence must not only be sufficient to establish the fact of 
assignment when that fact is in issue ( Qttan Wye v. Chin Lin 
Hee, 123 Cal. 185 [55 P. 783]) but the measure of sufficiency 
requires that the evidence of assignment be clear and positive 
to protect an obligor from any further claim by the primary 
oblig·ee ( Gnstafson v. Stockton etc. R. R. Co., 132 Cal. 619 
[64 P. 995] ). [6b] Here there was an assignment on the back 
of the note secured by the third trust deed which was pur-
portedly signed by P. H. Wierman for the Crestmore Com-
pany; there was no competent evidence with respect to the 
Crestmore Company, its membership, or P. H. Wierman's 
authority to bind that company. [9] Plaintiffs, claiming 
as assignees of that company, had the burden of proving the 
existenee and membership of the firm in order to support 
their claim of ownership of the note and third trust deed 
(Welch v. Alcott, 185 Cal. 731 [198 P. 626]). In Bengel v. 
Kenney, 126 Cal.App. 735 [14 P.2d1031], where the plaintiff 
elaimed title under an assignment of a purported assignee of 
a corporation but the evidence failed to show that the assign-
ment by the corporation was executed by a person having 
authority to do so, it was held that the evidence failed to show 
title in the plaintiff by reason of such an assignment. In 
Brown v. Ball, 123 Cal.App. 758 [12 P.2d 28], it was held 
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tlial tbe evidence insuftieient to establish the execntion 
wlH·.re then~ wm; uo evidence to show that 
tlw person 1rlwse name be 
thereto or that the had to 
('X('CII te the instrument. 
For the above' reasons it failed 
to prove a valid assigDmrnt of the note and thh·d trust deed 
to them. As stand in the same position as 
their .. the Crestmorc and mnst prove their 
elwin of title to the note in As was said in 
Braum v. supra, 123 '' ... we think that 
it wonld be a dangerous innovation to hold that on such proof, 
without more, an assignment purporting to be executed by 
an agrnt, as each of these were, con1d be introduced into 
eyidence. l-Ye are asked to presume not only that the persons 
whose names are subscriberl executed the assignments, 
but also that they had to do so merely bcccanse they 
were receiyed the mail m their form after 
having bern mailed to th<e assignors with a request 
1 hat they bP executed." In case, we would have 
to assnme the pm1ition of lluss and Ethyl Green in the chain 
of title, that the Crestmore Company had complied with the 
statutory provisiom relating to the use oi a fictitious name, 
;wd that P. II. \Vierman was a melllber of the firm with 
the authority to exeente an assignment of the note made 
payable to tbat firm. Snell assumptions, would indeed, con-
stitute a "dangerous innovation." 
Plaintiifs colltend that the trial court erred in finding that 
the balance alleg·cdly (lue them under the third trust deed 
was not as alleged; that the liens of the third and fourth trust 
deeds werr extinguished by the foreclosure of the second trust 
deed; and that the defendants were entitled to the surplus 
funds as ownrrs of an unrecorded deed to the property. Error 
is also claimed in the admission of testimony, over objection, 
of tlw consideration paid by plaintiff to the Crestmore Com-
pany. [11] In view of our eonclusion that plaintiffs failed 
io prove a valid assignment to them of the note secured by 
the thin1 deed of trust, they have no standing' to complain 
of the jndgmcnt Rwarding the surplus to the defendants 
wl!o were the only other claimants therefor. 'l'he other errors 
complained of do not require discussion. 
'rhe findings o£ the trial court are amply sustained by 
the_ record, and the :findings support the judgment. 
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'l'he judgment is, therefore, affirmed. 
Uibson, C. ,] ., Shenk, J ., 'l'raynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the judgment solely upon the 
ground that the record does not show, as a matter of law, 
that the trust deed under which the appellants claim was exe-
cuted by one who at that time was the owner of the property. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. 
Justice Carter's opinion holds that an issue as to the fact of 
assignment must be presumed to have been raised and that the 
evidence fails to prove an assignment of the note to the plain-
tiffs. Neither the record nor the law supports this holding. 
The clerk's transcript shows that the answer of the defend-
ants T. E. Denny and Edna Denny does not contain any 
denial sufficient to raise an issue as to the fact of assignment. 
The language of the answer is as follows : ''Answering Para-
graph IV of said complaint, these defendants do not have 
sufficient information as to the allegation contained therein, 
and basing their denial upon that ground, generally and 
specifically deny the same.'' 
It has been the law of this state for the past 95 years that 
an attempted denial in the form and substance of the language 
above quoted raises no issue. (Aronson & Co. V. Pearson 
(1926), 199 Cal. 295, 297-298 [249 P. 191]; May v. Board of 
Directors of El CaminQ Irr. Dist. (1949), 34 Cal.2d 125, 127 
[208 P.2d 661]; North v. Evans (1931), 117 Cal.App. 317, 320 
l3 P .2d 609].) As repeatedly pointed out in the cases section 
437 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant 
if he "has no information or belief upon the subject sufficient 
to enable him to answer an allegation of the complaint ... 
may so state in his answer, and place his denial on that 
ground,'' but it is wholly insufficient to merely aver lack of 
information or knowledge as a basis for denial, and, as held 
in the May case, supra, ''A denial in that form is insufficient 
to present an issue on the subject of ownership.'' 
However, even if we assume that the fact of plaintiffs' 
title to the note (and accompanying security) was placed in 
issue the ultimate result must be the same. The evidence 
as to plaintiffs' ownership is uncontradicted. The opinion 
seeks to avoid its effect on two theories: 1. That the evidence 
of ownership is not competent or sufficient; 2. That ·the 
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plaintiffs' title must fail because they did not prove that 
the payee of the note, the '' Crestmore Co., a Limited Partner-
ship,'' had complied with section 2468 of the Civil Code. 
As to the first contention, the evidence shows without 
dispute that plaintiffs had possession of the note, that they 
produced it, and that on the reverse side it was endorsed 
''The undersigned does hereby assign this note to the account 
of [plaintiffs] ... , as of the 27th day of August, 1951. 
[Signed] The Crestmore Co. P. H. Wierman." The note was 
purchased through an escrow for a consideration purporting 
to amount to a value of at least $6,300. The production of 
the note, without more, was sufficient evidence of ownership. 
It is presumed that "things which a person possesses are owned 
by him" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 11) and when a 
note purporting to bear the endorsement of the payee is 
produced by the transferee it is presumed that the transferee 
has acquired it for value and is the owner thereof (Waldrip 
v. Black (1887), 74 Cal. 409, 411-412 [16 P. 226]; Ramboz 
v. Stansbury (1910), 13 Cal.App. 649, 652 [110 P. 472]; 
Carver v. San Joaquin Cigm· Co. (1911), 16 Cal.App. 761, 
769 [118 P. 92]). Under the circumstances shown the evi-
dence does not support a finding that plaintiffs do not have 
title. (Reinert v. Proud (1935), 8 Cal.App.2d 169, 171 [47 
P.2d 491]; see also Sipe v. W. I. Hollingsworth & Co. (1950), 
99 Cal.App.2d 391, 392 [221 P.2d 991) .) 
The second contention in the majority opinion-that plain-
tiffs must fail because they did not prove that their pred-
ecessor in interest, the Crestmore Company, had complied 
with section 2468 of the Civil Code-is wholly devoid of 
merit. This is not an action to recover on the note; it is 
a proceeding for declaratory relief. If the plaintiffs are the 
owners of the note but cannot maintain an action on it until 
their predecessors have complied with section 2468 the court 
should so declare. Section 2468 cannot work a forfeiture of 
the plaintiffs' title to the note or to the funds here involved; 
it could, at most, be availed of as a plea in abatement in an 
action on the note. (Kadota Fig Assn. v. Case-Swayne Co. 
(1946), 73 Cal.App.2d 796,802 [167 P.2d 518].) Further-
more, the pleadings in this case are completely silent on this 
issue; there is no plea in abatement. A plaintiff is not re-
quired to allege or prove compliance with this section, since 
noncompliance is a matter of defense, and the issue cannot 
be raised for the first time on appeal. (Phillips v. Goldtree 
(1887), 74 Cal. 151, 154-155 [13 P. 313, 15 P. 451]; see, also, 
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"Vance v. Gilbert (1918), 178 Cal. 574,578 [174 P. 42].) "The 
rule is also settled that it is not necessary that the plaintiffs 
have complied with the statute at the time of the commence-
ment of the action; that it is sufficient if they have done so 
at the time at least when issue as to the matter of abatement 
is made." (Rtcdneck v. So1tthern California M. & R. Co. 
(1920), 184 Cal. 274, 282 [193 P. 775].) Here, that issue 
has never been made. 
It follows that the judgment of the trial court should 
be reversed. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied March 25, 
1954. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[S. F. Nos. 18593, 18640. In Bank. Feb. 24, 1954.] 
THOMAS W. GOW ANLOCK et al., Respondents, v. JAMES 
TURNER, as Manager of Utilities, etc., et al., Appel-
lants; JOSEPH ROBINSON, Intervener and Appellant. 
[1] Statutes-Mandatory and Directory Acts.-Requirements of a 
statute are directory, not mandatory, unless means be pro-
vided for its enforcement. 
[2] Municipal Corporations-Employees- Compensation- Hours 
of Service and Overtime.-San Francisco Charter, § 125, de-
fining basic work day for platform men or bus operators in 
municipal railway system as eight hours, to be completed with-
in ten consecutive hours, and providing overtime pay for all 
labor performed in excess of eight hours in any one day, 
does not require city to pay for eight hours of work on a 
given day or 48 hours per week regardless of duties performed, 
but merely specifies basis of compensation for employees. 
[3] !d.-Employees-Compensation-Hours of Service and Over-
time.-Failure of former San Francisco Charter, § 33 (carried 
into § 150 of new charter in 1932) to change basic provision 
that "No ... employee of the City and County shall be paid 
for a greater time than that covered by his actual service," at 
time § 125 of charter, relating to basic work day for platform 
men or bus operators in municipal railway system, was 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 247 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Municipal Corporations, § 25fi et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Statutes, § 11; [2-5] Municipal Cor-
porations, § 301; [6-11] Municipal Corporations, § 302. 
